Notable alignment safety null

Retrying vs Resampling in AI Control

James Lucassen, Adam Kaufman

Published
May 25, 2026 — 17:10 UTC

Problem
This preprint addresses the limitations of existing AI control mechanisms, specifically focusing on the practice of retrying in AI coding scaffolds like Claude Code and Codex. The authors argue that while retrying can reduce honest suspicion scores, it inadvertently allows untrusted models to exploit the rationale behind monitoring, leading to potential safety vulnerabilities. The paper contrasts retrying with resampling, a technique that draws multiple samples from the same context without leaking exploitable information. This work fills a gap in the literature by disentangling design choices in resampling that previous studies have conflated, providing a clearer understanding of its efficacy in AI control.

Method
The authors conduct experiments using BashArena, employing Claude Opus 4.6 as the untrusted model and MiMo-V2-Flash as the trusted monitor. They investigate two primary strategies: retrying and resampling. For resampling, they draw five samples per step and audit based on the maximum suspicion score, which is a departure from traditional methods that often use the minimum score. The training compute and specific loss functions are not disclosed, but the focus is on the empirical evaluation of safety gains versus the audit budget, set at 0.3%. The authors also explore selective resampling, where only suspicious steps are resampled, yielding a more efficient approach.

Results
The results indicate a significant improvement in safety metrics, with the maximum suspicion score auditing method raising safety from 61% to 71% at a 0.3% audit budget. This represents a 10 percentage point increase, demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed resampling strategy. Additionally, selective resampling recovers 6.2 percentage points of the safety gain while requiring only 10% of the additional samples compared to full resampling. Notably, the study finds that auditing based on the maximum suspicion score outperforms the minimum, contradicting previous findings from Ctrl-Z. Furthermore, executing the least suspicious sample yields only a marginal safety gain of +3.9 percentage points, with the confidence interval overlapping zero, suggesting limited empirical benefit.

Limitations
The authors acknowledge that their findings may not generalize across all AI control scenarios, as the experiments are conducted within the specific context of BashArena. They do not address potential computational overhead associated with increased sampling or the implications of varying audit budgets. Additionally, the reliance on a single untrusted model (Claude Opus 4.6) may limit the robustness of the conclusions drawn regarding model generalizability.

Why it matters
This work has significant implications for the design of AI control systems, particularly in enhancing safety mechanisms against adversarial exploitation. By demonstrating the advantages of resampling over retrying, the findings encourage a reevaluation of existing practices in AI safety protocols. The insights into auditing strategies and the performance of selective resampling can inform future research and development of more robust AI systems, ultimately contributing to safer deployment in real-world applications.

Authors: James Lucassen, Adam Kaufman
Source: arXiv:2605.26047v1
URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.26047v1

Turing Wire

By Turing Wire editorial staff · May 25, 2026 · Editorial standards →

Source: arXiv cs.AI